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ABSTRACT
Information security is very important in today’s society. Computer intru-
sion is one type of security infraction that poses a threat to all of us. Almost every
person in modern parts of the world depend upon automated information. Infor-
mation systems deliver paychecks on time, manage taxes, transfer funds, deliver
important information that enables decisions, and maintain situational awareness
in many different ways. Interrupting, corrupting, or destroying this information
is a real threat. Computer attackers, often posing as intruders masquerading as
authentic users, are the nucleus of this threat. Preventive computer security mea-
sures often do not provide enough; digital firms need methods to detect attackers
who have breached firewalls or other barriers. This thesis explores techniques to
detect computer intruders based upon UNIX command usage of authentic users
compared against command usage of attackers. The hypothesis is that computing
behavior of authentic users differs from the computing behavior of attackers. In
order to explore this hypothesis, seven different variables that measure computing
commands are created and utilized to perform predictive modeling to determine the
presence or absence of a attacker. This is a classification problem that involves two
known groups: intruders and non intruders. Techniques explored include a proven
algorithm published by Matthius Schonlau in [17] and several predictive model vari-
ations utilizing the aforementioned seven variables; predictive models include linear




1.1 Statement of the Problem
Security poses a problem for today’s society. Numerous threats from our envi-
ronment aim to breach security, and since 9-11, the importance of vigilant security
measures has escalated. There is a very serious threat that exists today that is silent,
virtually transparent, and seemingly anonymous; this threat is computer intrusion.
Society today depends on an uninterrupted flow of vital information. Malicious at-
tackers intend to stop, interrupt, and alter this flow of information. As society grows
increasingly reliant on computers, the importance of computer security grows.
There are numerous techniques used to enhance the security of information
and computers. Many of these techniques attempt to block or deter attackers,
preventing them from intruding in the first place. These techniques include many of
our everyday encounters such as user-accounts and passwords, firewalls, and VPN
encryption. All of these techniques aim to keep the wrong people out and the right
people in. However, attackers continually strive to break through these barriers and
invade protected information. These barriers are preventive measures, and digital
firms must augment these preventive measures by implementing intrusion detection
systems (IDS) that monitor the network and detect fraudulent or unusual activity.
This thesis explores a computer security problem known as host based intrusion
detection, and in particular, masquerade detection. This is a binary classification
problem that involves authentic users and low instances of masqueraders posing
as authentic users. Utilizing captured command usage logs of UNIX users, statis-
tics that measure these commands serve as a platform for classification. Some of
the statistics created included recent published methods by other researchers, and
several of the statistics are novel. The goal of this thesis involves:
1. Replicating work performed by other researchers with this data to capture
proven successful techniques and statistics for the masquerade detection problem.
2. Merge these successful proven statistics with independently developed
1
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statistics and explore interaction with multivariate statistics.
3. Applying proven cutting edge supervised classification models to achieve
superior classification rates.
The purpose of a host based IDS is to detect malicious use of user privileges,
often detected as novelties or anomalies. Certain characteristics of computer IDS
define their effectiveness. The typical measures of an IDS involve accuracy of detec-
tion, often expressed as a true positive rating and false positive rating. The overall
effectiveness of an IDS can be shown on a receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve, which will be explained later in detail. A typical problem with intrusion
detection involves minimizing false positive alarms while maintaining an acceptable
rate of true positives. For example, if an IDS identifies 50% of users as intruders,
but less than 10% of those identified are actual intruders, the digital firm will inves-
tigate the activities of one half of all users and consider suspending user accounts
until the investigation is complete. Examining 50% of all user activities and creat-
ing frustration for 50% of all users is not acceptable for most digital firms, realizing
that only a fraction of the 50% are attackers. Minimizing false positive ratings is a
key criterion when evaluating an IDS, even while realizing that a lower true positive
rating will occur.
Intrusion detection is inherently a statistical problem [5]. The problem involves
collecting a sample of data, describing the data through statistical attributes, and
then classifying the data based upon these attributes. Oftentimes intrusion detection
involves identifying intruders without any training data and without any indication
of their intrusion technique. The brand of intrusion detection explored in this project
is driven by developing profiles of authentic users and developing methods to detect
anomalies based upon a stream of new data that may or may not be from the
authentic user. If the attributes of the new stream of data significantly strays from




Schonlau et. al. [5, 6, 7, 17, 16] conducted the original work with the data
examined in this thesis. Their contributions included a thorough analysis of sev-
eral statistical techniques for identifying masqueraders. Schonlau et. al. explored
approaches that include: Bayes one-step Markov model, hybrid multistep Markov
model, text compression, Incremental Probabilistic Action Modeling (IPAM), se-
quence matching, and a uniqueness algorithm[5]. Schonlau stressed the importance
of minimizing false positives, setting a goal of 1% or less for all of his classification
techniques. Schonlau’s uniqueness algorithm, explained in [17], achieved a 40% true
positive rating before crossing the 1% false positive boundary. Wang [19] used one-
class training based on data representative of only one user and demonstrated that
it worked as well as multi-class training. Coull [4] applied bioinformatics matching
algorithm for a semi-global alignment to this problem. Lee [12] built a data mining
framework for constructing features and model for intrusion detection.
Roy Maxion contributed insightful work with this data that challenged both
the design of the data set and previous techniques used on this data [14, 13]. Maxion
uses a 1v49 approach in [14], where he trains a Naive Bayes Classifier one user
at a time using the training data from one user as true negative examples versus
data from the forty-nine other users (hence 1v49) as true positive (masquerader)
examples. Maxion claimed the best performance to date in [14], achieving a true
positive rating of 60% while maintaining a false positive rating of 1% or less. Maxion
also examines masquerade detection with a similar data set that contain command
arguments in [13].
1.2.1 The Necessity to Investigate Supervised Learning Approaches for
Intrusion Detection
The research documented in this thesis differs from the abovementioned au-
thors for several reasons. The prediction model or learning machine used for our
experiments is Rosipal’s Kernel Partial Least Squares (KPLS) [15]. As the title indi-
cates, it is based upon the partial least squares techniques popularized in chemomet-
rics. KPLS is an extremely efficient learning machine, especially for high dimensional
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data, but it only applies to the supervised learning domain. The existing literature
that explores the Schonlau et. al. (SEA) dataset exclusively considers unsupervised
learning. Intrusion detection, and masquerade detection, should be considered as
both a supervised and unsupervised learning problem. Supervised and unsupervised
learning represent two domains of learning theory that should contribute and pro-
vide synergy to each other. The criticism for using supervised learning for intrusion
detection, specifically in the masquerade detection scenario, is that we never know
what the masquerader actually does, so it is impossible to train with true positive
examples. The SEA dataset, along with other masquerade detection datasets that
were constructed in a similar fashion, is a complete anomaly to this criticism. The
SEA dataset utilizes surrogate masqueraders. The masquerading incidents within
the SEA test data are nothing more than commands taken from another user’s
stream of authentic, non-malicious commands and probabilistically inserted (at a
very sparse rate) in place of another user’s authentic commands. Therefore, this
dataset does not contain authentic masquerading data. The SEA dataset short-
comings also include a lack of context over objects as indicated by Maxion in [13].
However, the extensive research based upon this dataset proves that the SEA data
poses a non-trivial problem. The underlying assumption surrounding the examina-
tion of these surrogate masqueraders is that techniques that work well with these
surrogates should extend into the real domain.
The argument behind using a supervised learning approach with this dataset
ties directly to this assumption. An assumption is that simulating true positive
examples, or using existing true positive examples from this data set for training is
valid. Therefore, I propose that a supervised learning machine can and should be
applied with this data.
1.2.2 Schonlau’s Analysis
Matthius Schonlau is the researcher who created the dataset analyzed in this
thesis. Schonlau developed, analyzed, and compared numerous detection algorithms
which have already been mentioned.
Particular attention is given to the uniqueness algorithm (which is based on
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unpopular commands)[17], replicating this technique with several programs written
in perl. Following the work of Schonlau accomplished two critical goals: by repli-
cating his work and achieving the same results through new text mining programs,
a validity check for the programs is accomplished. Secondly, his work with this
dataset is comprehensive, and understanding and replicating his work provides a
solid foundation of knowledge that enables further exploration of this dataset.
Shortly after finishing the initial programming and validity check with Schon-
lau’s algorithm based upon unpopular commands[17], new techniques were explored.
It is possible to measure this data in numerous ways and provide quantities that a
learning machine can use to predict outcomes. After creating a new set of variables
that measure user behavior, these variables serve as a basis for experimentation
in predictive modeling with learning machines. The learning machine utilized in
this article is Rosipal’s K-PLS[15]. With numerous combinations of variables pre-
sented to the learning machine with different preprocessing techniques, exploration
of improved classification begins.
CHAPTER 2
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
2.1 Understanding the Dataset
Understanding the structure of the data is necessary before any programming
or initial analysis can be conducted. Schonlau collected this data from an AT&T
lab in New Jersey, observing the computing behavior of 50 users. The data set
consists of 50 users with each user contributing a stream of 15,000 truncated UNIX
commands. The user’s data stream is further divided into blocks of 100 commands,
thus creating 150 blocks of commands for each user. The first 50 blocks of data is
training data only (contains no masquerading data), and the remaining 100 blocks
of data contains masquerading data that appears based on a probability. Given
that there are 50 users, this implies that in total there are 5,000 tuples of data
in the non-intruded initial set and 10,000 tuples of data that potentially contain
intrusion data. Since the true outcome of each of these subsequent 10,000 tuples
is known, understand that there are only 256 intruded tuples. Only 2.56% of the
data contains intruders, which makes this a very difficult problem. It is a very
unbalanced classification problem. The objective is to determine if a block of data
contains masquerading data or not.
The initial programming effort involved determining the data dictionary (list
of every unique command). In addition to generating this list, the programs also
report the frequency of the commands and the popularity of the commands (number
of users who use distinct command). In an effort to validate the data dictionary,
frequency, and popularity of the commands, I relied upon a graph that plots distinct
commands vs. unique commands[17] and collaboration with Yongqiang Zhang based























Figure 2.1: I plotted the above left graph based upon results from Perl
programs that develop the data dictionary, frequency, and
popularity of the commands (based upon all 50 users). The
above right graph comes directly from Schonlau’s analysis of
the data[17]. As you can see, these two graphs (for approxi-
mately 50 users) are virtually identical.
The above graphs illustrate the uniqueness (1 - (total users of that command
/ total users)) of the distinct commands. As you can see, almost 50% of the dis-
tinct commands have a uniqueness of .98, meaning that almost 50% of the distinct
commands are used by only one user. In addition to gleaning this useful analysis
describing the popularity of the commands, replicating Schonlau’s graph reinforces
the validity of the Perl programs. In total, there are 856 distinct commands within
the entire data set, and within the training data set (first 5000 commands for each
user) there are 635 distinct commands.
2.2 Schonlau’s Algorithm
Now that the structure of this data is understood, this section will explain
how Schonlau utilized some of the variables and properties mentioned above to
predict intrusion or non intrusion for each test data tuple[17]. He utilizes a creative
algorithm for this. The algorithm truly formed the basis for this project, providing

























Table 2.1: Description of Schonlau’s variables
Name of Variable Description
Nu Number of commands in training data (5000)
nu Number of commands in test data (100)
Nuk Number of times user uses command k in training data
nuk Number of times user uses command k in test data
U Number of users (50)
Uk Number of users who use command k
K Number of distinct commands in training data (635)
A toy problem illustrating this algorithm is in Appendix A. The algorithm
computation follows:
1. Preprocess the training data (initial 5000 commands from each user) to
determine number of distinct commands, uniqueness of each command (number of
users who use command k), and command frequency for population and each user.
2. For each tuple of test data, calculate xu value (intruded data should score
close to -1, authentic data close to 1).
3. Determine acceptable threshold (between -1 and 1) and calculate confusion
matrix.
This technique is fundamentally different from typical machine learning meth-
ods; it is simply a fancy statistic. This technique calculates a test statistic xu,
which is based upon command history and uniqueness properties of the commands
in the dataset. Schonlau utilizes both the command usage history of the particular
user and the entire population to predict on the test data. The first 5000 tuples of
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data are training data, and there is no intrusion present. This is the data utilized
to develop the data dictionary, uniqueness, and frequencies. When the xu value is
calculated for a tuple of test data, the algorithm relies upon the uniqueness and fre-
quency of commands seen from both the user and the population to determine each
summed value. Unique commands never used by the user tend to drive the summa-
tion towards -1, where commands that are typical of the user drive the summation
towards +1.
The algorithm achieves exceptional results considering the unsupervised nature
of the learning. In order to better understand the algorithm and the dataset, I wrote
several perl programs that created the necessary data dictionary and executed the
above algorithm.
These programs will generate the xu value, a number between -1 and 1 for each
stream of 100 commands. The total output is an array of 5000 numbers between -1
and 1 (50 users, each user has 100 data-blocks (100 commands each) of test data,
thus an array of length 5000). Based upon the algorithm, a user whose data-block
contains commands similar to those used in the training data will tend to score
high, whereas a data block containing commands previously unused by the user
(especially if unpopular) will tend to score negative values. Once the array of 5000
test statistics is built, a single classification threshold can be determined in order
to develop a confusion matrix. If the test statistic is less than the threshold, the
program predicts an intruder; if the statistic is above the threshold, the program
predicts no intruder. Figure 2 illustrates three different confusion matrices produced
by the program that analyzes the 5000 test statistics.
The confusion matrix shows the performance of the IDS at a particular oper-
ating point, however an ROC curve is necessary to illustrate the overall performance
of the IDS. In order to build the data for an ROC curve, the technique utilized gen-
erated results for 1600 incremental values of the classification threshold (increments
of .001 from -.89 to .7). This essentially generated 1600 confusion matrices, and
when listed in an array format one can easily calculate points along the ROC curve
for the system. The below ROC curves represent the results of two algorithms that
I analyzed (the second algorithm is a very slight modification of the original).
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Figure 2.2: The confusion matrices shown above were generated by a Perl
program that analyzes the 5000 test statistics. From top to
bottom, the corresponding classification thresholds are -.3,
-.25, and -.28.
ROC curves measure the false positive rating vs. the true positive rating (see
Appendix B). In order to compare two ROC curves, the area under the curve (AUC)
represents the comparative measure. Since an ROC curve represents a classification
system, the AUC is a comparative measure for several classification systems. The
AUC is an overall performance measure of a classifier, however it is important to
understand that minimal false positives is paramount with IDS. I will illustrate with
the best ROC curve attained that the AUC is equivalent to Schonlau’s uniqueness
algorithm AUC, however a false positive rate of 0 is maintained for much higher
true positives. This indicates a better classifier. The next section describes the
development of new variables that describe user behavior and explores the statistical
nature and predictive power of these variables.
2.3 Programming in Perl
Several programs written in perl enabled the analysis of this dataset. perl is
designed to manipulate and mine textual data, which was ideal for this dataset.
There are six programs that formed the basis for the analysis of this dataset. Each
user’s commands existed in a single file, and the Perl programs opened these files and
extracted the statistics necessary to describe user behavior and perform predictive
























AREA UNDER THE CURVE : 0.9490
'ROC.txt'
Figure 2.3: The above ROC curves represent results from the Perl pro-
grams written to execute and analyze the performance of
Schonlau’s uniqueness algorithm which is based on unpopu-
lar commands.
of each user and creates a data dictionary of distinct commands. The program also
determines the overall frequency an popularity of commands. The program called
user popularity determines the number of times each user utilized each distinct
command. There is also a program that calculates Schonlau’s algorithm, and this
program titled algorithm debug creates a file that contains the xu value for the 5000
tuples of test data. The next step involves analyzing the xu values, the the program
results analysis debug calculates the confusion matrices and the true positive / false
positive ratings necessary to build the ROC curve. Chapter 3 discusses several
new variables introduced to provide further insight and explore the possibility of
building a more powerful prediction model. There are two programs that support
the analysis of these new variables, titled features and 601features. The below figure
illustrates the flow of data and through the Perl programs, and Appendix C contains
the source code of these programs.
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RAW DATA
50 different files, each containing 15,0000 truncated Unix commands from a single 
user, provide the raw data necessary to begin the analysis.  The first 5,000 commands 
of each file are known to be authentic, however the last 10,000 commands could 
contain the presence of an intruder.
PREPROCESSING
The dictionarytrain program reads every file and creates an output file that contains a 
dictionary of distinct commands and the frequency and popularity of each distinct 
command.  The userpopularity program determines the number of times each user 
utilized each distinct command. 
CALCULATING SCHONLAU’S ALGORITHM
The algorithm_debug program calculates 
Schonlau’s algorithm, producing an xu value for 
each of the 5000 tuples of test data.  The 
results_analysis_debug program calculated the 
confusion matrices and true positive / false 
positive ratings to build an ROC curve.
PREDICTION MODELING WITH NEW 
VARIABLES AND A K-PLS LEARNING 
MACHINE
The programs titled features and 601features
calculate variable for newly created variables, built 
largely from the statistics produced by 
dictionarytrain and userpopularity, and creates 
output files in MetaNeural format prepared to feed 
into the Analyze software for prediction modeling 
using a K-PLS learning machine.   
Figure 2.4: Flow chart of Perl programs
CHAPTER 3
INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS OF NEW
VARIABLES
3.1 The New Variables
After validating the Perl programs and developing a solid understanding of the
dataset, new variables were necessary to create different techniques that accurately
predict the presence or absence of an intruder. Several of these variables are also
utilized in Schonlau’s algorithm, but generally in a different manner. These variables
were created with the goal of developing a technique to measure the behavior of
computer users in a manner that captures the differences between intruders and
authentic users. There are a number of techniques available to capture computer
user behavior and/or network behavior. This technique is largely a function of the
dataset utilized. Remember that the dataset contains truncated UNIX commands
collected from fifty different users. Out of the 15,000 commands contributed from a
user, the first 5,000 commands are untouched and the latter 10,000 contain intrusion
data based upon a low probability. The new variables and the prediction models
involving these new variables work primarily with this latter 10,000 commands from
each user. Therefore, with each user contributing 100 tuples of data for this section,
there are a total of 5,000 tuples that we will examine. Typically, these 5,000 tuples
will be scrambled, divided into a training set and test set, and fed into a learning
machine. These new variables we are discussing measure the overall characteristics
of the 100 commands contained within the tuple, and these variables can be seen in
Table 1.
An important aspect that remained true throughout the search for effective
classification involved the importance of Mahalanobis scaling the data - essentially
normalizing every entry in the data matrix - subtracting the mean and dividing
by the standard deviation of the variable. This was due to the extreme ranges
of different variables; with similar reasoning, the covariance matrix provides little
useful information, however the correlation matrix provides a true measure of the
13
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Table 3.1: Description of new variables
Name of Variable Description
1 % of Unix commands Percent of commands that are Unix
2 % Top 20 most popular commands Fraction of commands that are within the
top 20 most popular commands in the data
set
3 % of internet commands Fraction of commands that are in-
ternet/email commands (sendmail and
netscape)
4 Average Uniqueness Averages Uniqueness (number between .02
and .98 ) for entire data set
5 Average Frequency Averages the frequency of each command
in the dataset
6 % of foreign commands Percent of commands never seen before -
this will be zero for all training data
7 xu value xu value from Schonlau’s algorithm[17], es-
sentially providing a signature index that




The correlation matrix is a scaled representation of the covariance; correlation
is the scaled linear association between two variables eliminating the impact of units
of measure. The correlation matrix shows that there is a definite relationship be-
tween the ”% foreign commands” and the ”% of UNIX commands” since the value of
this coefficient is very close to -1. One other pair of variables, ”% Top 20” and ”Aver-
age Frequency”, were highly correlated at a value of .7. In order to create a physical
representation of the correlation matrix, an option in Analyze(computational in-
telligence software package written by Professor Mark Embrechts, RPI) produced
the below colored representation of the correlation matrix. The highly correlated
variables - coefficients that take on values close to 1 and -1 - were represented as
darker colors, while the uncorrelated variables - coefficients that take on values close
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to zero - were represented as light colors such as white. The software created a color
coded matrix that was mostly light colored with a couple spots of darker colors,
confirming the numerical observations of the correlation coefficients.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1 0.214 0.047 0.243 0.196 -0.998 0.018
2 0.214 1 0.298 0.391 0.686 -0.202 0.178
3 0.047 0.298 1 0.154 0.341 -0.049 -0.117
4 0.243 0.391 0.154 1 0.47 -0.245 -0.196
5 0.196 0.686 0.341 0.47 1 -0.194 0.056
6 -0.998 -0.202 -0.049 -0.245 -0.194 1 -0.011
7 0.018 0.178 -0.117 -0.196 0.056 -0.011 1
Correlation Matrix
Figure 3.1: Numerical and Colored Correlation Matrices
3.3 Color Description of Variables
It is sometimes possible to predict a response directly from the values of the
variables, without any learning machine or algorithm.
Fisher’s Iris data
Computer Intrusion Detection Data
Figure 3.2: Colored Description of Variables
If a variable takes on a certain range of values for one response, and a separate
range for another response, it is sometimes possible to infer with a good degree of
certainty the response based on a single variable or multiple variables that have this
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property. ”Fisher’s Iris data” is a great illustration of this point. Four predictor
variables - petal length, petal width, sepal length, and sepal width are used to
determine the type of iris. The Analyze software package is used to color code
observations from the dataset.
In the Iris dataset it is apparent that the sepal length and width (first two
variables) cannot be used to determine the type of iris since the colors do not
have a distinct similarity with those in the response column. On the other hand,
the colors generated for the petal length and width are distinctly similar to the
response column. So we can say that petal length or petal width can be used to
fairly accurately predict the type of iris. The computer intrusion dataset was sorted
by the ”Intrusion/ Non-Intrusion” column and color coded in the same way as the
Iris data set. These new variables introduced for the computer intrusion detection
problem do not exhibit this type of behavior.
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3.4 Principal Component Analysis
The primary purpose of principal component analysis is to determine the util-
ity in reducing the variables into linear combinations that explain the majority of
variance from the dataset; this is essentially a technique in reducing dimensionality.
Additionally, one can observe that principle components often naturally segregate or
cluster groups within the data. This natural clustering or grouping was the purpose
behind the principal component analysis conducted on this data set. It is possi-
ble that the score plot of the principal component loadings from a data set would
naturally discriminate. Unfortunately, this phenomenon did not occur. As seen in
the below graphs, the intrusion points (red) are centered near the centroid of all
points. These plots do not provide good discrimination between intrusion and non
intrusion.
Figure 3.3: Principal component score plots for the 1st PC vs 2nd PC
and 1st PC vs 3rd PC. Red dots indicate intruders, blue dots
are authentic users.
3.5 Linear Discrimination Analysis
Prediction modeling was the next effort to follow the initial exploration of the
data. An obvious technique to explore for the classification of two groups from a
multivariate data set is discrimination analysis. We explore discrimination analysis
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as a first step in prediction modeling of this data. If a simple linear discrimination
model can sufficiently predict the groups of this data set, there may be no need
to explore further. Secondly, linear discrimination analysis could expose charac-
teristics of this data not seen before. Linear discrimination analysis proved more
effective than quadratic discrimination analysis, with linear discrimination analysis
consistently providing superior true positive and false positive rates. This is likely
due to the fact that although the correlation matrices of these two groups are not
identical, they are similar enough to gain significant predictive power through linear
discrimination analysis. The linear discrimination rule can be succinctly stated as
follows[11]:
Let x̄1 represent the mean vector of intruded training data, and let x̄2 represent
the mean vector of non intruded training data. Allocate test data tuple x0 to non
intrusion if:
(x̄1 − x̄2)T (S−1pooled)x0 −
1
2







The general procedure for applying this discrimination rule involves utilizing
a training set to develop the mean vectors and the pooled correlation matrix. The
classification step proceeded with introducing a tuple from the test data and ap-
plying the above rule. The results from testing 1000 tuples of test data produces
a confusion matrix, essentially itemizing the number of correct classifications vs.
incorrect classifications in accordance with the groups. The below figure illustrates
and example of a confusion matrix. (note: we use a binary value to denote an in-
truder or non intruder; a binary value of 0 represents no intrusion, where a value of
1 represents an intruder).
This particular confusion matrix represents the performance of the linear dis-
crimination analysis when the probabilities for each type of group are equal (.5 for
each group). We’ll explain the significance of examining multiple ranges of proba-
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pred 0 pred 1
act 0 799 165
act 1 21 15
TP% 0.416667
FP% 0.171162
Figure 3.4: Confusion matrix for Linear Discrimination Analysis
bilities below. The above confusion matrix captures an important result from the
classification procedure: it enables the calculation of true positive and false positive
which forms the basis for comparing classification systems. We define true positive
as correctly classifying an intruder (predict 1 when actually 1), and a false positive
is defined is incorrectly classifying a non-intruder (predict 1 when actually 0).
The above discrimination rule enables classification for a certain operating
point, where the costs and probabilities are fixed. However, comparing classifica-
tion systems at one operating point does not provide sufficient comparison. The
performance of classification systems must be considered across a sufficient range of
operating characteristics, providing a thorough representation of the systems per-
formance. Therefore, the range of consideration could be explored by varying the
probability of intrusion and probability of no intrusion. Changing these probabili-
ties by subtracting .1 from one and adding .1 to the other produced changes in the
confusion matrix; this essentially changes the tolerance of the test, allowing analysis
across a range of operating points. The result of this range of operating points is
a Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve, or ROC curve, that plots false positive
on the x axis and true positive on the y axis. Plotting the operating characteristics
of several confusion matrices produces an ROC curve as shown below. A common
method of evaluating a classification system is to measure the area under the curve
(AUC).
The area under the curve for the Linear Discrimination Analysis classification
system is .702, which illustrates an effective classification system. Throughout this
report the area under the curve will serve as a measure to compare alternative
classification systems.
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Figure 3.5: ROC Curve for Linear Discrimination Analysis
3.6 Clustering
Clustering is a technique commonly used for more than two groups or when
the number of groups is unknown. However, due to the nature of clustering (deter-
mining a measure or method to separate groups), clustering can serve as an effective
tool for discrimination. An initial clustering attempt applied K-means clustering to
this data set, however poor results occurred. The next technique explored involved
distance comparisons, using distance to the centroid of each group as a similarity
measure. An initial attempt comparing Euclidean distances to the centroid of each
group produced an interesting result that is commonly known as the curse of dimen-
sionality. Every point in this seven dimensional hyperspace was almost equidistant
from another point! The next obvious step involved reducing dimensionality by
choosing only two variables that produced a good clustering of the groups. Through
trial and error, we determined that the variable measuring the percent of internet
commands and the xu value from Schonlau’s algorithm produced good separation
between the groups. Euclidean distance measurements provided adequate classifi-
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cation, however Minkoski’s equation for distance provided the best classification,
utilizing a value of 5 for m. For each tuple of data in the test data, we measure
Minkoski’s distance to the centroid observed in the training data, and classify into
the group that measures the closest[11].
d(x, x̄no int) = [
p∑
i=1
|xi − x̄no int|m]1/m (3.2)
d(x, x̄int) = [
p∑
i=1
|xi − x̄int|m]1/m (3.3)
The above equations represent Minkoski’s distance equation, where x̄int rep-
resents the centroid of intrusion training data, and x̄no int represents the centroid of
non intrusion training data. p is the number of variables measured (p = 2 provided
the best results).
Once again, it was important to collect a range of values for this classification
tool in order to evaluate overall performance of the system. In order to obtain a
range of confusion matrices, we introduced an offset value. Initially, if d(x, x̄int)
represents the distance between a test data point and the centroid of intrusion data,
if d(x, x̄int) was greater than d(x, x̄no int) then the decision rule was to classify the
point as a non intruder. However, by introducing an offset variable w, the new
rule assigned a point as a non intruder if d(x, x̄no int) < d(x, x̄no int) − w, where w
ranged from .2 to 1.2. This range of values for w produced an array of confusion
matrices, again providing a method of plotting an ROC curve. The ROC curve for
our clustering analysis with Minkoski’s distance metric is shown below.
The area under the curve is .722, which shows a slight improvement from
our discrimination analysis. Of particular interest in this ROC curve is the very
steep slope for small values of the false positive. An important aspect of computer
intrusion detection involves minimizing false positive. A false positive indicates that
some authentic user has been targeted as a attacker. The implications of this could
involve temporary suspension of user privileges until the situation is resolved or the
employment of manual inspection to determine the accuracy of this classification
(most intrusion detection systems pass all reports of an intruder on to an employee
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Figure 3.6: ROC Curve for Clustering with Minkoski’s Distance Metric
who manually inspects the case; a high number of false positives is costly for this
reason).
CHAPTER 4
APPLICATION OF KERNEL PARTIAL LEAST
SQUARES
4.1 Kernel Partial Least Squares
Partial Least Squares Regression (PLS) was conceived by the Swedish statis-
tician Herman Wold for econometrics modeling of multi-variate time series[20]. The
first PLS publication was a sociology application in 1975[21]. His son, Svante Wold,
applied PLS to chemometrics in the early eighties [23, 22] and currently PLS has
become one of the most popular and powerful tools in chemometrics, mainly because
of the quality of building models with many variables. PLS is not easy to explain
and the mathematics involved is far from transparent. Partially for that reason PLS
has a low emphasis in mainstream statistics and machine learning.
KPLS is a technique that has grown from partial least squares analysis. The
study of partial least squares(PLS) is similar to principal components analysis
(PCA).
PLS analysis considers the response vector (or matrix for multiple responses),
typically denoted as Y. PLS regression is a technique that maximizes latent variable
correlation with the response vector. Therefore, the first latent variable (which is
again a linear combination of the input variables), possesses maximum correlation
with the response variable while remaining orthogonal to the remaining latent vari-
ables. Since the first few partial least squares components or latent variables capture
the majority of correlation with the response variable, powerful prediction models
result with desirable dimension reduction properties.
Rosipal explains in [15] how to extract these PLS components. Utilizing the
NIPALs approach, this is the algorithm that Rosipal discusses:
1. randomly initialize u
2. w = XTu
3. t = Xw, t ← t‖t‖
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4. c = YT t
5. u = Yc, u ← u‖u‖





After step 7, the first PLS component is found and the next PLS component
can be extracted from the deflated X and Y matrices using the same algorithm.
At each full iteration (completion of step 7), store the t,u,w and c vectors.
These vectors will create matrices T,U,W and C which will be used to complete
the PLS regression model. Writing the typical regression model as
Y = XB +F
where B is our regression matrix and F is the residual matrix, Rosipal shows
in [15] the following:
B = XTU(TTXXTU)−1TTY
The key to Kernel PLS (KPLS) is realizing the kernel matrix formed in the
algorithm shown above between steps 2 and 3. The algorithm for KPLS is no
different than what is shown for the PLS algorithm, except steps 2 and 3 combine
to create:
t = φφTu, t ← t‖t‖
φ represents the nonlinear function, or kernel function, that transforms the
input variables into feature space. φφT is the well known kernel matrix. KPLS
provides the attractive aspect of feature reduction while also combining the powerful
similarity technique that exists within nonlinear kernels. Our typical choice for the
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kernel function is the gaussian kernel, defined as:
K(xi, xj) = e
‖xi−xj‖
2σ2
The free parameter σ is necessary with this kernel, requiring minimal tuning.
4.2 Seven Feature Model
The analysis of the new variables in chapter 3 provides insight into the relation-
ship between the variables and the descriptive power of these variables. Exploring
fundamental properties such as correlation, principal components, and colored de-
scriptive plots often reveals dynamics amongst the variables that is simple but not
intuitive or obvious. If a response could be predicted simply from one variable or
a linear combination that reduces dimensionality, there is no need to use learning
machines - it is a simple problem. Unfortunately, this is not a simple problem.
Further analysis is required.
The AnalyzeTM software package is the primary vehicle for analysis from this
point forward [8]. Previous analysis and preprocessing utilized Perl programs and
some simple spreadsheet calculations, however now that all of the variables have been
produced and represented in the MetaNeural format required by AnalyzeTMAnalyze,
predictive modeling can begin.
The most obvious method for prediction modeling given the set of new vari-
ables described is to simply represent each tuple of data with a combination of these
seven variables. Let us call this the seven feature model. This is the initial approach.
The file to be processed by the learning machine contained 5000 tuples of data, each
containing 7 feature variables, the outcome (0 for non intrusion, 1 for intrusion),
and an identification number. The identification number is a six digit number that
uniquely identifies each tuple. Here is an example of a tuple of preprocessed data:













XU Intrusion/Not Intrusion ID# 
0.61 0 0.8549 6309.74 0 -0.2784 0 143101 
 
Figure 4.1: A example tuple of preprocessed data with the new variables
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One final crucial step in data preprocessing consisted of the scaling of the data.
During the previous discussion of principal components and the correlation matrix,
I indicated that the relationship between variables is much more meaningful with
scaled data. Learning machines also require scaled data to extract meaning and ac-
curately learn and predict. Each variable, to include the response, was Mahalonobis
scaled. After scaling the variables, the final step involved splitting the data into a
training and testing set (4000 tuples were used for training, 1000 tuples for testing),
and then the learning machines processed the information. Once the raw data is in
MetaNeural format, Analyze operators perform and provide the scaling, splitting,
and predictive modeling, and all necessary analytical results.
The ROC curve for the seven feature model is illustrated below. The AUC is
.907.
 
Figure 4.2: The ROC curve for the seven feature model. The AUC is
.907.
4.3 601 feature model
In addition to the seven feature model, I expanded the detail of the features in
an attempt to improve the prediction. Each variable in the seven feature model is
an average or percentage for the entire tuple of 100 commands considered. The only
exception to this is the xu value, which is a measure of the entire tuple. Therefore,
27
each command can be represented by six different values, each value representing
variables one through six. The result of this approach is a tuple of 601 features (the
extra feature is Schonlau’s xu value). The results of this 601 feature model were
surprisingly not better than the seven feature model. The 601 feature model was
cumbersome because of its size, required a much longer processing time, and did
not predict as well. I have two educated guesses why this model did not predict as
well:
1. Consider each variable as some type of random variable that could be
modeled with a probability density function. The original seven feature
model contained averages and percentages - a function of a summation
of each variable for each command of the tuple of 100 commands. This
average or percentage represents a statistic, and it is likely that these
statistics are functions of sufficient statistics, which implies that re-
gardless of how the observations are manipulated, further information
regarding the true parameters of the underlying probability density
functions that form these statistics cannot be obtained. Therefore,
improvement is not an option if the variables calculated are already
functions of sufficient statistics. The theory of sufficient statistics is
addressed in [1]
2. This file is too large and cumbersome for the KPLS learning machine.
There is a curse of dimensionality. When the dimensionality grows too
large, classification becomes very difficult because every tuple becomes
equally dissimilar. Reduced and meaningful dimensions provide much
more predictive power.
The discussion of the performance of Rosipal’s KPLS with these two models
introduces again the topic of the σ tuning parameter. This parameter greatly im-
pacts the performance. This model utilizes Gaussian kernels. The Gaussian kernels




The σ value in this equation is a tuning parameter - it needs to be adjusted to
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create optimal performance. The tuning of this σ value proved critical for achiev-
ing optimal performance with Rosipal’s KPLS learning machine. Consider the 601
feature model. Rosipal’s KPLS achieved a number of different values as I modified
the sigma value. The below table illustrates the impact of tuning sigma with all
other conditions remaining constant. The table shows a range of sigma values and
the observed AUC of the ROC curve.
Table 4.1: Illustration of the impact of the sigma value against the per-
formance of the learning machine, measured here through the
AUC














Although this table illustrates only integer values for sigma, sigma can actually
take any real number value. The purpose of the table is to illustrate the impact of
changes in sigma. The table also illustrates how much worse the 601 feature model
performed vs. the seven feature model. As you can see, the best AUC for the 601
feature model was .7745.
4.4 IMPROVING THE MODEL
The previous analysis indicates that KPLS is a robust learning machine that
captures all of the relevant information presented by the variables, regardless of
the form of the variables presented. This is similar to the logical argument regard-
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ing sufficient statistics previously mentioned. In order to improve the performance
of the model, the data needed to improve with the addition of relevant variables
that uncover information that is not contained in the previous variables. Two new
variables are presented.
A simple transition probability matrix model can be constructed to capture
the likelihood of a user transitioning from one command to the next based upon
previous behavior. For every user, given that there are 635 distinct commands, a
transition matrix, T ∈ R635×635, is created. Allowing tij to represent the ith row and
jth column, this value is equivalent to the probability of transitioning from the ith
command to the jth command. Given the kth test tuple of l = 1...100 commands,




tl where tl = tij when i = l − 1, j = l (4.2)
For each test tuple we calculate this variable that we will refer to as the
transition variable. This variable is different from previous variables created in that
it measures patterns; the order of the commands presented matters.
The other variable created is a very simple measurement inspired by the xu
variable. Referred to as the new variable, it is a count of how many new commands
are in the test tuple that have never been used by the user. Ranging from 1 to 100,
this variable has a surprising predictive power.
This variable by itself performs better as a single scalar predictor than any
of the previously mentioned techniques with the exclusion of the xu variable. This
certainly reinforces the cliche of “garbage in - garbage out”. However, it is interesting
to see what occurs when this variable is combined with the others. The AUC
jumps to .95, which is equivalent to the xu variable, however notice the value of the
true positive axis when the false positive rate increases from 0. The true positive
rate is slightly greater than .7 at this point. This illustrates the caution that is
necessary when considering the AUC as the overall performance measure. The
AUC is largely considered the best scalar performance measure for binary classifiers




























AREA UNDER THE CURVE : 0.9007
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Figure 4.3: ROC curve illustrating the predictive power of solely the new
variable
measure of performance. If minimizing false positives is important, a false positive
boundary can be chosen, such as FP = 1% as indicated by Schonlau in [5]; the
IDS is measured by the true positive rate that it achieves before crossing the false




















Figure 4.4: ROC curve of the performance achieved using every available
variable
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion
This thesis addresses a unique dataset that provides opportunity for the appli-
cation of data mining, statistics, and state of the art learning methods. Fundamen-
tal theoretical concepts of multivariate statistics have been discussed, and advanced
learning methods such as Kernel Partial Least Squares demonstrated remarkable
performance. Regardless of the models utilized and manipulation of statistics, it
was also reinforced that independent statistics with strong correlation with the de-
pendent variable consistently improve the model. The ROC curve is an invaluable
tool for the measurement of an IDS. It is an elegant, concise description of perfor-
mance. The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is an excellent scalar measurement of
the performance of a binary classifier, however the AUC has limitations. Two curve
of equivalent AUC may not represent equivalent classifiers in the eyes of a decision
maker. If maximizing performance in the low false positive range is a priority, or
perhaps maximizing true positives is a priority as it is in the medical field, other
metrics must be considered.
The significance of research in this field expands well beyond the digital realm
and computer intrusion detection. Intrusion detection is a security problem. This
security could involve an airport, a national asset, vital infrastructure, or even the
physical borders of our country. Every day Americans spend millions of dollars to
secure their way of life, and this research presents innovative techniques to provide
enhanced security. Although the vehicle of this research involves computer intrusion
and attackers, these same techniques could be generalized to enhance the security
of any important resource.
5.2 Future Work
An approach yet to be explored extensively involves combining several ROC
curves in an attempt to achieve a synergistic effect that results in optimal perfor-
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Figure 5.1: The above graph represents three ROC curves. The two black
curves are component algorithms or component systems, and
the dashed ROC curve represents a system that combines the
component systems and generates a synergistic effect with
improved performance.
The above illustrated approach differs from several alternatives that have been
explored by others. This chart, showing multiple ROC curves and an optimal syner-
gistic ROC curve, represents a proposal to search for an optimal classification system
by combining several systems. The vehicle for this research is intrusion detection
systems, however the potential application is much broader.
Utilizing multiple IDS to devise a superior hybrid system is not a new idea.
Tom Fawcett and Foster Provost explored the concept of an ROC convex hull. This
approach essentially maps several ROC curves onto one graph, and depending upon
the tolerance accepted by the digital firm, the optimal operating position is derived
from the convex hull of the ROC curves [10]. Huseyin Cavusoglu, Birendra Mishra,
and Srinivasan Raghunathan also analyze several IDS as an overall system, and
they describe optimal operating conditions based upon variables devised from a
game theory approach[3]. This game theory approach views the digital firm and the
attacker partaking in a game where they each stand to gain or lose, and based upon
the cost benefit ratio of both the digital firm and the attacker, there is an optimal
operating condition for the overall system. Both of these approaches mentioned
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above combine IDS algorithms in a parallel fashion, which differs from the in series
approach that I will take. Several IDS algorithms placed in series could also be
viewed as several filters placed in series. Each filter will classify data, but subsequent
filters will only classify data passed from previous filters. Any filter has the authority
to classify data as containing negative intrusion and authentic, and if this is the case
that user is classified as authentic and will not be analyzed any further. However, if
a filter classifies data as containing an intruder then the next filter will also analyze
this data.
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APPENDIX A
Tutorial in Calculating the xu Value
A.1 A Toy Problem with Five Commands
The calculation of Schonlau’s xu is not entirely intuitive. It is also helpful to
discuss why this statistic is so powerful for anomaly detection and exactly where this























Table A.1: Description of Schonlau’s variables for Toy Problem
Name of Variable Description
Nu Number of commands in training data (5000)
nu Number of commands in test data (5)
Nuk Number of times user uses command k in training data
nuk Number of times user uses command k in test data
U Number of users (50)
Uk Number of users who use command k
K Number of distinct commands in training data (635)
Now let us consider an example that contains only five commands in the test
tuple, as reflected above. These commands are cpp, sh, xrdb, cpp, sh, in that order.
There are three distinct commands within these five, and we can begin to calculate
the necessary variables as shown in figure A.1.
In calculating Wuk, notice that the behavior of the other users influences the
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calculation. This is shown in figure A.2. This is a consistent theme with Schonlau’s
uniqueness approach. The power of the approach comes from measuring one users
behavior not only against her own previous behavior but also against the behavior
of the population. A strong penalty occurs if a command that has never been used
by a user appears in the test data. We will see in step three how this penalty is
magnified or dampened depending on the popularity of the new command seen.
Figure A.3 illustrates how the popularity of a command influences the calcu-
lation. Popular commands receive minimal weight, assuming that it is more likely
for a user to suddenly start using a popular command rather than an unpopular
command. Notice from the calculation how a string of unpopular commands never
used by a user can drive the xu value in the negative direction.
The final step involves a simple summation. This short toy problem has a
positive value, indicating an authentic user, which it is.
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a.    Tuple is:  cpp, sh, xrdb, cpp, sh






Figure A.1: Step 1 of the toy problem
b.    Calculate Wuk for each command:
Consider cpp:
Wuk = (Nuk / Nu) / ∑uvuk
Wuk = (38 / 5000) / (2225 / 5000) = .01708
Notice from algorithm that if a distinct 
command is not used, null effect…if 
user never used command in training, 






Figure A.2: Step 2 of the toy problem
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c. Let y = Wuk (1 – (Uk/U)) nuk (for notation)
Calculate y for each distinct command:
Consider cpp:
y = .01708 ( 1 – (45 / 50)) 2 = .00342
Notice from algorithm that if many users 
use command, impact minimal…
Notice that although xrdb is only used 
once, the impact is the most 
significant…this is because xrdb is 







Figure A.3: Step 3 of the toy problem
d.







Figure A.4: Step 4 of the toy problem
APPENDIX B
RECEIVER OPERATING CHARACTERISTIC (ROC)
CURVES
B.1 The Confusion Matrix and Hypothesis Testing Defini-
tions
Confusion matrices, ROC curves, and hypothesis testing have very much in
common. Many of the terms used with these tools are synonymous, and often these
terms are misunderstood. The below matrix which illustrates the four regions of a
typical hypothesis testing problem defines the applicable terms.
Good
Probability = 1 – α
Frequently called Confidence
(This will be referred to as True 
Positive when discussing ROC 
curves; an alternative term is 
sensitivity, typically used by 
the medical community.)




Bad – Type II Error
Probability = β
(This will be referred to as a 
False Positive – medical 
community often plots this on 
the x axis as 1-specificity.)
Good
Probability = 1 – β
Frequently called Power
(The medical community refers 
to this as specificity.)
H0 is False
(No Intrusion)







Figure B.1: Hypothesis testing regions and terms
As seen in the above figure, there are numerous terms used to describe the
performance of a classification system. The medical community uses only specificity
and sensitivity. For our purposes, we will use false positive and true positive.
The confusion matrix stems directly from the above discussion. A confusion
matrix represents the outcome of an attempt to classify known groups. When dealing
with an IDS, there are only two groups: intruders or non intruders. Therefore,
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a confusion matrix for an IDS would contain four regions, representing the four






Figure B.2: Hypothesis testing regions and terms
From a confusion matrix, one can calculate both the false positive rating and







B.2 The ROC Curve
A Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve is a very complete, simple, and
elegant way to display the performance of a classification system. An ROC curve is a
graphic representation of the relationship between the probability of a true positive
outcome (sensitivity, 1-α error) and the probability of a false positive outcome (Type
II error(β) or 1-specificity). The earliest use of ROC curves can be traced back to
World War II during initial implementation of radar systems. It was very important
for radar systems to accurately detect aircraft. Radar systems could be set to a very
high and sensitive level, where every aircraft would definitely be detected, however
this would result in a tremendous number of false positives. Imagine the number of
false air alarms that could have been sounded over Great Britain if the Allied Forces
did not carefully manage the sensitivity setting of their radar systems! ROC curves
represent reality, where perfect detection or classification is usually not a possibility.
Users must determine classification settings, depending on a cost-benefit analysis of
what they are willing to accept as a true positive rating and a false positive rating.
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An ROC curve is a representation of the entire range of operating points that
a classification system has the capability to attain, and typically the user has the
flexibility to decide where to operate on the curve. The overall curve reflects the
quality of the classification system. The Area under the curve (AUC) is typically
used as method of comparing alternate ROC curves; the better ROC curve typically
has more AUC.
general threshhold, t, used to trigger IDS alarm This t corresponds to a point on the ROC curve, perhaps here.
Probability Density 
Function of Legal 
transactions
Probability Density 
Function of Illegal 
transactions
Figure B.3: The plot on the left shows the PDFs of legal and illegal
transactions (non intruders and intruders), respectively. The
ROC curve on the right shows the possible operating point
represented by the tolerance threshold shown on the PDF
plots.
The plot of the PDFs illustrates the idea of false positives and true positives.
The hashed area represents the probability of a true positive, and the small red area
represents a false positive. Imagine shifting the threshold, t, to the left. The true
positive rating would definitely increase, but so would the false positive. The user
must identify what point on the curve is acceptable, and this is usually accomplished
through a cost-benefit analysis.
APPENDIX C
Perl Programs
C.1 Introduction to the Programs
This appendix contains the source code from the six primary Perl programs
that the calculations necessary to analyze both Schonlau’s algorithm and prediction
models using the new variables. The following table briefly describes each program.
Table C.1: Description of Perl Programs
Name of Program Description
dictionarytrain This program analyzes each users initial
5000 commands and creates a data dictio-
nary of distinct commands. This program
also determines the overall frequency and
popularity of commands.
user popularity This program determines the number of
time each user utilized each distinct com-
mand.
algorithm debug This program calculates Schonlau’s algo-
rithm. The majority of variables from his
algorithm should look similar to the Perl
variables. This program creates a file that
contains the xu value for the 5000 tuples
of test data.
results analysis debug This program calculates the confusion ma-
trices and data necessary to build the ROC
curve from Schonlau’s algorithm.
features This program creates seven features for
each tuple of test data (5000 tuples).
601features This program creates 601 features for each




C.2.1 The dictionarytrain program
open (traintotal,">traintotal"); open (trainvar,">trainvar"); $j=1;
@total=@_;











print traintotal @total; #saves every command as an array
length 250K
}
$count=0; $a=1; $b=2; for ($i=0;$i<250000;$i++) {









for ($j=0;$j<$count;$j++) #determines if cmd is already in
dictionary















$i=0; for ($i=0;$i<$count;$i++) {
chomp $dictionary[$i][$a];
print "$dictionary[$i][$a] $dictionary[$i][$b] \n";
}
$i=0; for ($i=0;$i<$count;$i++) {
print trainvar "$dictionary[$i][$a],$dictionary[$i][$b]\n";
}
print "\n"; print "$count distinct commands."; print "\n";
$total=@total; print "$total total commands.\n"; print "\n";
open (traincmddict,">traincmddict"); open
(traincmdcount,">traincmdcount");




##Below lines determine the popularity of the commands.
open (traincmddict,"traincmddict"); open (popular, ">popular"); open
(popvar,">popvar");
$j=1; @total=@_; @popularity=@_;
$k=0; for ($k=0;$k<635;$k++) {
@popularity[$k]=0;
}
























C.2.2 The user popularity program


















































C.2.3 The algorithm debug program
$start=time(); print "Start time: $start\n"; open
(usertraindict,"usertraindict"); @utraintotal=<usertraindict>;
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} print "User test blocks complete.\n"; $time=(time()-$start)/60;
$time=sprintf("%.2f",$time);
print "Total elapsed time: $time min\n"; print "Now comparing test
blocks with user training dictionary...\n\n"; print @all_lines[0];
open (traincmddict,"traincmddict"); @traincmddict=<traincmddict>;





























print "Test blocks analyzed against user training dictionary.\n";
$time=(time()-$start)/60;
$time=sprintf("%.2f",$time);
print "Total elapsed time: $time min\n"; print "Now computing
algorithm...\n";




















































print "Program complete.\n"; $time=(time()-$start)/60;
$time=sprintf("%.2f",$time);
print "Total elapsed time: $time min\n";
C.2.4 The results analysis debug program
$start=time(); print "Start time: $start\n";







$test=substr(@trueresults[99],1,1); print $test; #print
@trueresults[99];



















































print " predicted positive predicted negative"; print "\n";
print "actual positive $truepositive $falsenegative\n"; print
"actual negative $falsepositive $truenegative\n";





















































print "Program complete.\n"; $time=(time()-$start)/60;
$time=sprintf("%.2f",$time);
print "Total elapsed time: $time min\n";
C.2.5 The features program
$start=time(); $now=time()-$start; print "Start time: ($now)\n";
open (unix_commands,"unix_commands.txt"); open (traincmddict,
"traincmddict"); @unix_commands=<unix_commands>;


































$i=0; for ($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
print internet_cmd "@internet_cmd[$i]\n";
}























open (popvar,"popvar"); @popvar=<popvar>; open
(trainfreq,"trainfreq.txt"); @trainfreq=<trainfreq>;



































$now=time()-$start; print "features created for all training
commands;\n"; print "now measuring against data; time elapsed:
$now sec\n";
open (true,"true"); @true=<true>; open
(featurematrix,">featurematrix"); open
(testfeaturematrix,">testfeaturematrix"); open (xu,"xu"); @xu=<xu>;








































$now=time()-$start; print "program complete; time elapsed: $now
sec\n";
C.2.6 The 601features program
$start=time(); $now=time()-$start; print "Start time: ($now)\n";
open (unix_commands,"unix_commands.txt"); open (traincmddict,
"traincmddict"); @unix_commands=<unix_commands>;


































$i=0; for ($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
print internet_cmd "$internet_cmd[$i]\n";
}
























open (popvar,"popvar"); @popvar=<popvar>; open
(trainfreq,"trainfreq.txt"); @trainfreq=<trainfreq>;






























$now=time()-$start; print "features created for all training
commands;\n"; print "now measuring against data; time elapsed: $now
sec\n";
open (true,"true"); @true=<true>; open (sevenC,">sevenC"); open













































$now=time()-$start; print "program complete; time elapsed: $now
sec\n";
